Permissible Negligence and Campaigns to Suppress Rights

8 Pages Posted: 16 Nov 2016  

Glenn Harlan Reynolds

University of Tennessee College of Law

Date Written: November 15, 2016

Abstract

In his The Second Amendment Right To Be Negligent, 68 Fla. L. Rev. 1 (2016), Andrew McClurg looks at statutory protections shielding gun owners and sellers from liability in cases of theft, etc. in terms of what he calls a constitutional “right to be negligent” under the First and Second Amendments. In this brief response, I look at that question, and also touch, briefly, on the to-me interesting aspect that the protection enjoyed by publishers under the First Amendment was created by judicial action, while that enjoyed under the Second Amendment was instead the product of legislation. But, in short, I argue that the common explanation for these “rights to be negligent” lies in the fact that both First and Second Amendment rights were, at different times, targeted by litigation campaigns involving cooperation (“collusion” might be too pejorative a word) between private litigants and government actors, where the litigation was focused more on limiting the extent of the rights than on compensating discrete injuries. I also touch upon the separation-of-powers argument for statutory rights to be negligent in, at least, the Second Amendment context.

Keywords: Reynolds, Mcclurg, Second Amendment, Firearms, Liability

Suggested Citation

Reynolds, Glenn Harlan, Permissible Negligence and Campaigns to Suppress Rights (November 15, 2016). Florida Law Review, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2869978

Glenn Harlan Reynolds (Contact Author)

University of Tennessee College of Law ( email )

1505 West Cumberland Avenue
Knoxville, TN 37996-1810
United States
865-974-6744 (Phone)

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