Not Quite the Same: Regulatory Intermediaries in the Governance of Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices

Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Sciences 670, Forthcoming

35 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2016

See all articles by Martino Maggetti

Martino Maggetti

University of Zurich

Christian Ewert

University of Zurich, Institute for Political Science

Philipp Trein

University of Lausanne, IEPHI

Date Written: March 2017

Abstract

This article compares the role of regulatory intermediaries in the governance of pharmaceuticals and medical devices in Australia and Switzerland. We argue that the creation, selection, and activation of specific intermediaries depend on the organizational capacity of the regulator and on the capture potential of the target. To limit the risk of capture of intermediaries where the regulated industries are powerful, regulators tend to keep intermediaries under their control. To do so, the regulator must be well-funded and well-staffed, or supported by its political principal. However, when the target has limited capture potential, regulators will rely more heavily on externalized intermediaries. These intermediaries typically consist of transnational organizations in charge of multiple regulatory issues in several jurisdictions, and can provide unique expertise in an efficient way. Four case studies of the Australian and Swiss regulatory regimes for therapeutic products support this argument.

Keywords: health policy, regulatory agencies, regulatory intermediaries, therapeutic products, Australia, Switzerland, regulatory governance

Suggested Citation

Maggetti, Martino and Ewert, Christian and Trein, Philipp, Not Quite the Same: Regulatory Intermediaries in the Governance of Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices (March 2017). Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Sciences 670, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2869987

Martino Maggetti

University of Zurich ( email )

Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland

Christian Ewert

University of Zurich, Institute for Political Science ( email )

Seilergraben 49
CH-8001 Zurich
Switzerland

Philipp Trein (Contact Author)

University of Lausanne, IEPHI ( email )

Lausanne, Vaud CH-1015
Switzerland

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