Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry

25 Pages Posted: 17 Nov 2016

See all articles by Jay Pil Choi

Jay Pil Choi

Michigan State University - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Subhasish M. Chowdhury

University of Bath - Department of Economics

Jaesoo Kim

Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2016

Abstract

We investigate simultaneous inter‐ and intra‐group conflict in the shadow of within‐group power asymmetry and complementarity in members' group‐conflict efforts. A more symmetric group faces a higher degree of internal conflict, and might expend more effort in external conflict when the group‐conflict effort technology is highly complementary. Depending on the degree of complementarity, the stronger player's relative contribution to external conflict might be higher in a more asymmetric group and, as a result, it is possible for the weaker player to earn a higher payoff. In the absence of any complementarity, the rent‐dissipation is non‐monotonic with the within‐group power asymmetry.

Keywords: Asymmetry, collective action, conflict, group contest

JEL Classification: C72, D72, D74, H41

Suggested Citation

Choi, Jay Pil and Chowdhury, Subhasish M. and Kim, Jaesoo, Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry (October 2016). The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, Issue 4, pp. 816-840, 2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2870824 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12152

Jay Pil Choi (Contact Author)

Michigan State University - Department of Economics ( email )

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East Lansing, MI 48824
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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Subhasish M. Chowdhury

University of Bath - Department of Economics ( email )

Claverton Down
Bath, BA2 7AY
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/subhasishmc/

Jaesoo Kim

Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) - Department of Economics ( email )

425 University Boulevard
Indianapolis, IN 46202-5140
Germany

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