Partisan Targeting of Inter-Governmental Transfers & State Interference in Local Elections: Evidence from Spain

Documents de Treball de l’IEB 2012/31

44 Pages Posted: 17 Nov 2016

See all articles by Marta Curto-Grau

Marta Curto-Grau

University of Barcelona

Albert Sole-Olle

University of Barcelona; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Pilar Sorribas-Navarro

University of Barcelona - Faculty of Economic Science and Business Studies

Date Written: December 7, 2012

Abstract

We examine whether state-level incumbents discriminate in the allocation of transfers in favour of local governments controlled by co-partisans, and whether the electoral prospects of local incumbents improve when they are aligned with the state incumbent. Using a new database covering around 3,000 Spanish municipalities during the period 2000-07 and a Regression Discontinuity design, we document a very strong and robust effect: in close races, municipalities aligned with the regional government obtain on average 83% more per capita transfers and their incumbents gain 10% more votes at the local elections. We also show that the effect of alignment is stronger: (i) when regional and local elections are held on the same day, (ii) in regions with less competitive regional elections, and (ii) in regions with more budget resources.

Keywords: Political Parties, Inter-Governmental Transfers, Pork Barrel Politics

JEL Classification: C2, D72

Suggested Citation

Curto-Grau, Marta and Sole-Olle, Albert and Sorribas-Navarro, Pilar, Partisan Targeting of Inter-Governmental Transfers & State Interference in Local Elections: Evidence from Spain (December 7, 2012). Documents de Treball de l’IEB 2012/31 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2871052 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2871052

Marta Curto-Grau (Contact Author)

University of Barcelona ( email )

John M. Keynes, 1-11
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

Albert Sole-Olle

University of Barcelona ( email )

Gran Via de les Corts Catalanes, 585
Barcelona, 08007
Spain

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Pilar Sorribas-Navarro

University of Barcelona - Faculty of Economic Science and Business Studies ( email )

Barcelona
Spain

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
47
Abstract Views
201
PlumX Metrics