Paid Peering and Investment Incentives for Network Capacity and Content Diversity

29 Pages Posted: 20 Nov 2016 Last revised: 1 Nov 2017

Soo Jin Kim

Michigan State University, Department of Economics

Date Written: October 31, 2017

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effects of industry practice, the "paid peering'' agreement, on conflicting incentives to invest in Internet network delivery quality and content diversity and on social welfare. I find that an Internet Service Provider is more likely to invest in network capacity to improve delivery quality under a paid peering agreement. On the other hand, Content Providers tend to invest in content diversity under settlement-free peering regimes because of hold-up problems. Due to the conflicting effects of paid peering on investment incentives, the overall effect on social welfare is ambiguous, depending largely on the extent to which consumers value network quality and content diversity.

Keywords: Paid Peering, Interconnection, Net Neutrality, Two-Sided Market, Investment Incentives, Internet Service Provider, On-line Video Distributor(OVD)

Suggested Citation

Kim, Soo Jin, Paid Peering and Investment Incentives for Network Capacity and Content Diversity (October 31, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2872908 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2872908

Soo Jin Kim (Contact Author)

Michigan State University, Department of Economics ( email )

East Lansing, MI
United States

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