Counselling and Monitoring of Unemployed Workers: Theory and Evidence from a Controlled Social Experiment

57 Pages Posted: 18 Oct 2001

See all articles by Gerard J. van den Berg

Gerard J. van den Berg

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Bas van der Klaauw

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Date Written: October 2001

Abstract

We investigate the effect of counselling and monitoring on the individual employment transition rate. We theoretically analyze these policies in a job search model with two search channels and endogenous search effort. In the empirical analysis we use unique administrative and survey data concerning a social experiment with full randomization and compliance. The results show that counselling and monitoring do not affect the work exit rate. Monitoring causes a shift from informal to formal job searching. We combine our empirical results with the results from our theoretical analysis and the existing empirical literature to establish a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of these policies. randomized social experiment

Keywords: Unemployment duration, search effort, active labor market policy, treatment, search channels, multi-tasking,

JEL Classification: J58, J64, J65

Suggested Citation

van den Berg, Gerard J. and van der Klaauw, Bas, Counselling and Monitoring of Unemployed Workers: Theory and Evidence from a Controlled Social Experiment (October 2001). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2986. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=287307

Gerard J. Van den Berg (Contact Author)

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31 20 444 6132 (Phone)
+32 20 444 6020 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Tinbergen Institute

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Bas Van der Klaauw

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31 20 444 6120 (Phone)
+31 20 444 6005 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Tinbergen Institute

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

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