Constitutions and Social Networks

Core Discussion Paper, 2014/3

41 Pages Posted: 23 Nov 2016

See all articles by Ana Mauleon

Ana Mauleon

Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles; Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Nils Roehl

University of Paderborn

Vincent J. Vannetelbosch

Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Date Written: January 21, 2014

Abstract

The objective of the paper is to analyze the formation of social networks where individuals are allowed to engage in several groups at the same time. These group structures are interpreted here as social networks. Each group is supposed to have specific rules or constitutions governing which members may join or leave it. Given these constitutions, we consider a social network to be stable if no group is modified any more. We provide requirements on constitutions and players’ preferences under which stable social networks are induced for sure. Furthermore, by embedding many-to-many matchings into our setting, we apply our model to job markets with labor unions. To some extent the unions may provide job guarantees and, therefore, have influence on the stability of the job market.

Keywords: social networks, constitutions, stability, many-to-many matchings

JEL Classification: C72, C78, D85

Suggested Citation

Mauleon Echeverria, Ana Carmen and Roehl, Nils and Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., Constitutions and Social Networks (January 21, 2014). Core Discussion Paper, 2014/3. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2873495 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2873495

Ana Carmen Mauleon Echeverria (Contact Author)

Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles ( email )

Brussels, 1000
Belgium

Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) ( email )

34 Voie du Roman Pays
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, b-1348
Belgium

Nils Roehl

University of Paderborn ( email )

Warburger Str. 100
Paderborn, D-33098
Germany

Vincent J. Vannetelbosch

Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) ( email )

34 Voie du Roman Pays
1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, 1348
Belgium

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