Distorted Monopolistic Competition

66 Pages Posted: 22 Nov 2016

See all articles by Kristian Behrens

Kristian Behrens

University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) - Department of Economics

Giordano Mion

University of Sussex - Department of Economics; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Yasusada Murata

Nihon University

Jens Suedekum

Heinrich-Heine-University Duesseldorf, Duesseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Date Written: November 2016

Abstract

We characterize the equilibrium and optimal resource allocations in a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with multiple asymmetric sectors and heterogeneous firms. We first derive general results for additively separable preferences and general productivity distributions, and then analyze specific examples that allow for closed-form solutions and a simple quantification procedure. Using data for France and the United Kingdom, we find that the aggregate welfare distortion - due to inefficient labor allocation and firm entry between sectors and inefficient selection and output within sectors - is equivalent to the contribution of 6-8% of the total labor input.

Keywords: intersectoral distortions, intrasectoral distortions, monopolistic competition, welfare distortion

JEL Classification: D43, D50, L13

Suggested Citation

Behrens, Kristian and Mion, Giordano and Murata, Yasusada and Südekum, Jens, Distorted Monopolistic Competition (November 2016). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11642, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2873539

Kristian Behrens (Contact Author)

University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 8888, Downtown Station
Montreal, Quebec H3C 3P8
Canada

Giordano Mion

University of Sussex - Department of Economics ( email )

Falmer, Brighton BN1 9SL
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/giordanomionhp/

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Yasusada Murata

Nihon University ( email )

Tokyo
Japan

Jens Südekum

Heinrich-Heine-University Duesseldorf, Duesseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) ( email )

Universitaetsstr. 1
Duesseldorf, NRW 40225
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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