Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

A Capture Theory of Committees

37 Pages Posted: 1 Dec 2016  

Alvaro Name Correa

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Huseyin Yildirim

Duke University - Department of Economics

Date Written: November 24, 2016

Abstract

Why do committees exist? The extant literature emphasizes that they pool dispersed information across members. In this paper, we argue that they may also serve to discourage outside influence or capture by raising its cost. As such, committees may contain members who add no new information to the collective decision. We show that the optimal committee is larger when outsiders have higher stakes in its decision, lower quality proposals or more rivals, or when its members are more corruptible. We also show that keeping committee members anonymous and accountable for their votes can help deter capture.

Keywords: Committee, Capture, Bribe, Threat, Disclosure

JEL Classification: D02, D71, D72

Suggested Citation

Name Correa, Alvaro and Yildirim, Huseyin, A Capture Theory of Committees (November 24, 2016). Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper No. 239. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2873665

Alvaro Name Correa

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid ( email )

CL. de Madrid 126
Madrid, Madrid 28903
Spain

Huseyin Yildirim (Contact Author)

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

213 Social Sciences Building
Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States
919-660-1805 (Phone)
919-684-8974 (Fax)

Paper statistics

Downloads
38
Abstract Views
188