Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design

65 Pages Posted: 23 Nov 2016 Last revised: 5 Jun 2020

Date Written: June 5, 2020

Abstract

We introduce a new family of dynamic mechanisms that restricts sellers from using future distributional knowledge. Since the allocation and pricing of each auction period do not depend on the type distributions of future periods, we call this family of dynamic mechanisms non-clairvoyant.

We develop a framework (bank account mechanisms) for characterizing, designing, and proving lower bounds for dynamic mechanisms (clairvoyant or non-clairvoyant). We use the same methods to compare the revenue extraction power of clairvoyant and non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanisms.

Keywords: Dynamic Mechanism Design, Bank Account Mechanisms, Non-Clairvoyance, Dynamic Auctions, Approximations, Internet Advertising

JEL Classification: D44, C73, D82

Suggested Citation

Mirrokni, Vahab and Paes Leme, Renato and Tang, Pingzhong and Zuo, Song, Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design (June 5, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2873701 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2873701

Vahab Mirrokni

Google Inc. ( email )

1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
Second Floor
Mountain View, CA 94043
United States

Renato Paes Leme

Google Inc. ( email )

1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
Second Floor
Mountain View, CA 94043
United States

Pingzhong Tang

Tsinghua University ( email )

Beijing, 100084
China

Song Zuo (Contact Author)

Google Inc. ( email )

Beijing
China

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