Complete Information Pivotal-Voter Model with Asymmetric Group Size

25 Pages Posted: 25 Nov 2016 Last revised: 4 Oct 2018

See all articles by Christos Mavridis

Christos Mavridis

Lancaster University - Department of Economics

Marco Serena

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Date Written: November 22, 2016

Abstract

In this note, we characterize the equilibria of the standard pivotal-voter participation game between two groups of voters of asymmetric sizes, as originally proposed by Palfrey and Rosenthal [1983. A strategic calculus of voting. Public Choice. 41, 7-53].

Keywords: Costly Voting, Pivotal Voter Model, Complete Information

JEL Classification: C72, D72

Suggested Citation

Mavridis, Christos and Serena, Marco, Complete Information Pivotal-Voter Model with Asymmetric Group Size (November 22, 2016). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-07. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2874414 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2874414

Christos Mavridis

Lancaster University - Department of Economics ( email )

Lancaster LA1 4YX, LA1 4YX
United Kingdom

Marco Serena (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

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