Flexible Wages Systems and the Structure of Wages: Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data

42 Pages Posted: 16 Oct 2001

See all articles by Thomas K. Bauer

Thomas K. Bauer

Rhine-Westphalia Institute for Economic Research (RWI-Essen); University of Bochum - Faculty of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Stefan Bender

Government of the Federal Republic of Germany - Institute for Employment Research (IAB)

Date Written: September 2001

Abstract

A growing theoretical and empirical literature is concerned with the effects of flexible workplace systems or High Performance Work Organizations (HPWOs) on wages. Existing theoretical literature suggests that these forms of organization should lead to higher inequality across firms, increased segregation of labor markets and decreased within-firm inequality. This Paper makes use of a new employer-employee-linked data set for Germany to examine the labor market effects of flexible workplace systems. Our results suggest that HPWOs increase both across and within firm inequality. We do not find evidence, however, that HPWOs affect their employment structure.

Keywords: Organizational change, employment, linked employer-employee data set, inequality

JEL Classification: J30, L20, O30

Suggested Citation

Bauer, Thomas K. and Bender, Stefan, Flexible Wages Systems and the Structure of Wages: Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data (September 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=287477

Thomas K. Bauer (Contact Author)

Rhine-Westphalia Institute for Economic Research (RWI-Essen) ( email )

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University of Bochum - Faculty of Economics ( email )

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

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Stefan Bender

Government of the Federal Republic of Germany - Institute for Employment Research (IAB) ( email )

Regensburger Str. 104
Nuremberg, 90478
Germany
+49 911 179 3082 (Phone)
+49 911 179 3297 (Fax)

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