Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Shareholder Wealth vs. Stakeholder Interests? Evidence from Code Compliance Under the German Corporate Governance Code

33 Pages Posted: 25 Nov 2016  

Brigitte Haar

Goethe University Frankfurt - Research Center SAFE; Columbia University - Law School

Date Written: November 24, 2016

Abstract

In order to better differentiate the drivers of corporations’ actions, in particular shareholder wealth and stakeholder interests, the paper explores the significance of the comply or explain-principle and its underlying enforcement mechanisms more generally. Against this background, compliance rates with specific provisions may shed a light on companies’ reasons for following the code. An analysis of these rates at the example of distinct provisions of the German Corporate Governance Code is therefore entered into. In light of the current corporate governance debate and the legitimacy problems that are raised, among the code provisions that exemplify these questions very well are those regulating incentive pay, severance pay caps, and age limits for supervisory board members. Their analysis will lay a basis for an answer to the question about what motivates companies to comply with the code. The motivation then paves the way to arrive at a further specification of the determinants of the regulatory evolution of the Code and the range of stakeholders and their concerns that enter into it.

Keywords: corporate governance codes, soft law, stakeholder, shareholder wealth, market enforcement, German corporate governance, supervisory board, incentive pay, severance pay caps, age limits

JEL Classification: G38, K20, M12, M14, M52

Suggested Citation

Haar, Brigitte, Shareholder Wealth vs. Stakeholder Interests? Evidence from Code Compliance Under the German Corporate Governance Code (November 24, 2016). SAFE Working Paper No. 154. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2875275

Brigitte Haar (Contact Author)

Goethe University Frankfurt - Research Center SAFE ( email )

(http://www.safe-frankfurt.de)
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany
49-69-79833764 (Phone)
49-69-79833904 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/haar/

Columbia University - Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/Brigitte_Haar

Paper statistics

Downloads
55
Rank
316,626
Abstract Views
202