The Consequences of Information Revealed in Auctions

Columbia Business School, Economics and Finance Working Paper

59 Pages Posted: 17 Oct 2001

See all articles by Matthew Rhodes-Kropf

Matthew Rhodes-Kropf

Harvard Business School - Entrepreneurial Management Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Brett Katzman

University of Miami - School of Business Administration - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 2001

Abstract

This paper considers the ramifications of post-auction competition on bidding behavior under different bid announcement policies. In equilibrium, players attempt to signal information to their post-auction competitors through their bids. Thus, an auctioneer can take advantage of these attempts by strategically selecting which bids to announce and which to conceal. Revenue and efficiency implications of various announcement policies are examined and used to explain the prevalence of certain auction procedures in the world today.

Keywords: Information, Auction, Revenue Equivalence, Signalling, Participation, Cournot, Bertrand

JEL Classification: D44, D89

Suggested Citation

Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew and Katzman, Brett Eric, The Consequences of Information Revealed in Auctions (October 2001). Columbia Business School, Economics and Finance Working Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=287576 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.287576

Matthew Rhodes-Kropf (Contact Author)

Harvard Business School - Entrepreneurial Management Unit ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
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Brett Eric Katzman

University of Miami - School of Business Administration - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 248126
Coral Gables, FL 33124-6550
United States
305-284-1654 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.bus.miami.edu/~eco/aaa/faculty/List/katzman.htm

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