Reforming the Westminster Model of Agency Governance: Britain and Ireland After the Crisis
Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions Volume 29 (4), October 2016, pp.535–552
22 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2016
Date Written: May 13, 2016
Abstract
Conventional understandings of what the Westminster model implies anticipate reliance on a top-down, hierarchical approach to budgetary accountability, reinforced by a post-New Public Management emphasis on re-centralizing administrative capacity. This paper, based on a comparative analysis of the experiences of Britain and Ireland, argues that the Westminster model of bureaucratic control and oversight itself has been evolving, hastened in large part due to the global financial crisis. Governments have gained stronger controls over the structures and practices of agencies, but agencies are also key players in securing better governance outcomes. The implication is that the crisis has not seen a return to the archetypal command-and-control model, nor a wholly new implementation of negotiated European-type practices, but rather a new accountability balance between elements of the Westminster system itself that have not previously been well understood.
Keywords: Agencies, Britain, Ireland, Westminster, GFC
JEL Classification: H83; H70
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation