How Do Governments Fare About Redistribution? New Evidence on the Political Economy of Redistribution

30 Pages Posted: 29 Nov 2016

See all articles by Fabio Padovano

Fabio Padovano

University of Rome III - Department of Political Sciences

Francesco Scervini

University of Pavia

Gilberto Turati

Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Rome

Date Written: October 24, 2016

Abstract

We examine whether and to what extent political institutions explain different performances in income redistribution across countries. In particular, we first review available sources of data and measures of income redistribution, discussing the pros and cons of each one. Second, we outline a conceptual framework that distinguishes traditional demand side explanations of redistribution from resources and instruments, as well as supply side factors. We then provide empirical evidence on the association between these different factors and the observed degree of redistribution. Our analysis supports the view that – for a given demand of redistribution – political (and economic) institutions contribute to explain differences across countries in the observed degree of redistribution.

Keywords: redistribution, ex ante and ex post Gini coefficients, political and economic institutions

JEL Classification: D780, I380, H530, H110

Suggested Citation

Padovano, Fabio and Scervini, Francesco and Turati, Gilberto, How Do Governments Fare About Redistribution? New Evidence on the Political Economy of Redistribution (October 24, 2016). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6137, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2876569

Fabio Padovano

University of Rome III - Department of Political Sciences ( email )

Cia Corrado Segre 2
Roma, 00146
Italy
+390655176402 (Phone)
+390655176234 (Fax)

Francesco Scervini (Contact Author)

University of Pavia ( email )

Corso Strada Nuova, 65
27100 Pavia, 27100
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://https://francescoscerviniphd.wordpress.com/

Gilberto Turati

Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Rome ( email )

Largo F. Vito, 1
Rome, 00168
Italy

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