Shareholders’ Duties in Case of State Ownership

Published in Shareholders’ Duties, Hanne S. Birkmose (ed.), Kluwer Law International, 2017

Nordic & European Company Law Working Paper No. 18-12

26 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2016 Last revised: 20 Feb 2018

See all articles by Thomas Papadopoulos

Thomas Papadopoulos

Department of Law, University of Cyprus

Date Written: November 26, 2016

Abstract

This chapter seeks to examine shareholders’ duties in case of State ownership and more specifically, in case of privatized companies, where the State remains a shareholder. State ownership in privatized companies raises several questions, but this chapter will examine whether States have any particular duties as shareholders. The focus of the contribution is on the EU dimension of the topic, and the chapter will discuss shareholders’ duties in privatized companies at EU level, in the context of the golden shares’ case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The main argument is that the State participating in the capital of a privatized company has a general duty to protect the public interest. This general duty to protect public interest will be scrutinized in the light of the golden shares’ case law. Furthermore, the impact of other provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU(TFEU) will be discussed.

Keywords: Shareholders’ duties

JEL Classification: K22

Suggested Citation

Papadopoulos, Thomas, Shareholders’ Duties in Case of State Ownership (November 26, 2016). Published in Shareholders’ Duties, Hanne S. Birkmose (ed.), Kluwer Law International, 2017, Nordic & European Company Law Working Paper No. 18-12, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2876573 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2876573

Thomas Papadopoulos (Contact Author)

Department of Law, University of Cyprus ( email )

P.O. Box 20537
Nicosia, 1678
Cyprus

HOME PAGE: http://ucy.ac.cy/dir/en/component/comprofiler/userprofile/tpapad05

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