42 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2016 Last revised: 31 Jul 2017
Date Written: September 1, 2016
In the U.S., four in ten public infrastructure projects report delays or cost overruns. To tackle this problem, regulators often scrutinize the project contractor’s operations. We investigate the causal effect of government oversight on project efficiency by gleaning 262,857 projects that span seventy-one U.S. federal agencies and 54,739 contractors. Our identification strategy exploits a regulatory bylaw: if a project’s anticipated budget exceeds a threshold value, the contractor’s operations are subject to surveillance from independent procurement officers; otherwise, these operational checks are waived. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that oversight is obstructive to the project’s operations, especially when the contractor (i) has no prior experience in public projects, (ii) is paid with a fixed-price contract that includes performance-based incentives, and (iii) performs a labor-intensive task. In contrast, oversight is least obstructive — or beneficial — when the contractor (i) is experienced, (ii) is paid with a time-and-materials contract, and (iii) performs a machine-intensive task.
Keywords: Project Management, Vertical Contracting, Regression Discontinuity Design, Service Supply Chains, Government Operations
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Calvo, Eduard and Cui, Ruomeng and Serpa, Juan Camilo, Oversight and Efficiency in Public Projects: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis (September 1, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2876840