Using Fees to Reduce Bed-Blocking: A Game between Hospitals and Care Providers

35 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2016

See all articles by Snorre Kverndokk

Snorre Kverndokk

Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research

Hans Olav Melberg

University of Oslo, HELSAM, HERO

Date Written: October 27, 2016

Abstract

The Coordination Reform was introduced in Norway in 2012 including a fee for bed-blocking in hospitals. To study this, we introduce a Stackelberg game where the hospital is the leader and the care institution is the follower. The reform does not necessarily lead to less bed-blocking as this depends on the relative strength of the players’ concern for income and patients’ health, and the optimal discharge date before the reform. Testing the results with data, we find a large negative effect on bed-blocking and discharge date. Thus, financial incentives may count more than health incentives, or health effects of bed-blocking are insignificant.

Keywords: bed-blocking, care services, hospital services, health reform, Stackelberg game

JEL Classification: H750, I110, I180

Suggested Citation

Kverndokk, Snorre and Melberg, Hans Olav, Using Fees to Reduce Bed-Blocking: A Game between Hospitals and Care Providers (October 27, 2016). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6146. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2877111

Snorre Kverndokk (Contact Author)

Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research ( email )

Gaustadalleen 21
N-0349 Oslo
Norway
+47 22958811 (Phone)
+47 22958825 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.frisch.uio.no/cv/snorrek_eng.html

Hans Olav Melberg

University of Oslo, HELSAM, HERO ( email )

Harald Schjelderups hus
Forskningsveien 3a/2b
Oslo, 0373
Norway

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
25
Abstract Views
195
PlumX Metrics