Behavioral Strategies in Repeated Pure Coordination Games

32 Pages Posted: 27 Oct 2001

See all articles by Rami Zwick

Rami Zwick

University of California, Riverside

Amnon Rapoport

University of Arizona - Eller College of Management

Alison King Lo

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; Duke University - Graduate School

Abstract

We study experimentally a class of pure coordination games as a special case of the Consumer Choice of Prizes game developed by Rapoport et al. (2000). We find a high level of group coordination coupled with considerable switching in the choice of locations. Two models are proposed and tested to account for the results, one postulating the formation of conventions, and the other invoking the mixed strategy equilibrium solution for risk-neutral players. We reject both models as possible candidates to describe the behavioral regularities that we observe in the data. A third model that allows individual perturbations of commonly shared choice probabilities is proposed and tested. It accounts for the major results on the individual and aggregate levels.

Keywords: behavioral strategies, pure coordination games

JEL Classification: C72, C92, D83

Suggested Citation

Zwick, Rami and Rapoport, Amnon and Lo, Alison King, Behavioral Strategies in Repeated Pure Coordination Games. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=287805 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.287805

Rami Zwick (Contact Author)

University of California, Riverside ( email )

900 University Avenue
Riverside, CA 92521
United States

Amnon Rapoport

University of Arizona - Eller College of Management ( email )

McClelland Hall
P.O. Box 210108
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States
520-621-9325 (Phone)
520-621-4171 (Fax)

Alison King Lo

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

100 Main Street
E62-416
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-519-4088 (Phone)

Duke University - Graduate School ( email )

Durham, NC 27708-0097
United States

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