Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Who Will Vote Quadratically? Voter Turnout and Votes Cast Under Quadratic Voting

Forthcoming, Public Choice (2017)

Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 894

30 Pages Posted: 5 Dec 2016  

Louis Kaplow

Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Scott Duke Kominers

Harvard University

Date Written: December 2, 2016

Abstract

Who will vote quadratically in large-N elections under quadratic voting (QV)? First, who will vote? Although the core QV literature assumes that everyone votes, turnout is endogenous. Drawing on other work, we consider the representativeness of endogenously determined turnout under QV. Second, who will vote quadratically? Conditional on turning out, we examine reasons that, in large-N elections, the number of votes that an individual casts may deviate substantially from that under pure, rational QV equilibrium play. Because turnout itself is driven by other factors, the same determinants may influence how voters who do turn out choose the quantity of votes to cast. Independently, the number of votes actually cast may deviate dramatically from pure QV predictions because of the complex and refined nature of equilibrium play. Most plausibly, voting behavior and outcomes would be determined predominately by social and psychological forces, would thereby exhibit few of the features emphasized in the analysis of hyper-rational equilibrium play, and would have consequential properties that require a different research agenda to bring into focus. Some of our analysis also has implications for voting behavior under other procedures, including one person, one vote.

Keywords: Voting; voter turnout; paradox of voting; quadratic voting; pivotality; elections

JEL Classification: D71, D72, D82

Suggested Citation

Kaplow, Louis and Kominers, Scott Duke, Who Will Vote Quadratically? Voter Turnout and Votes Cast Under Quadratic Voting (December 2, 2016). Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 894. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2878922

Louis Kaplow (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

1575 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-4101 (Phone)
617-496-4880 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/facdir.php?id=32&show=bibliography

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Scott Kominers

Harvard University ( email )

Rock Center
Harvard Business School
Boston, MA 02163
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.scottkom.com/

Paper statistics

Downloads
29
Abstract Views
199