Collective Bargaining and Innovation in Germany: A Case of Cooperative Industrial Relations?

49 Pages Posted: 7 Dec 2016

See all articles by John T. Addison

John T. Addison

University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Paulino Teixeira

Universidade de Coimbra - Faculdade de Economia; Center for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Katalin Evers

Government of the Federal Republic of Germany - Institute for Employment Research (IAB)

Lutz Bellmann

Institute for Employment Research (IAB); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Date Written: January 2017

Abstract

At the level of theory, the effect of collective bargaining on innovation is contested. The large proponderance of the U.S. evidence clearly points to adverse effects, but other‐country experience suggests that certain industrial‐relations systems, or the wider regulatory apparatus, might even tip the balance in favor of unions. Our pooled cross‐ section and difference‐in‐differences estimates provide some weak evidence that German collective bargaining inhibits innovation. However, in conjunction with workplace representation, there is the suggestion that it might actually foster innovative activity.

Suggested Citation

Addison, John T. and Teixeira, Paulino and Evers, Katalin and Bellmann, Lutz, Collective Bargaining and Innovation in Germany: A Case of Cooperative Industrial Relations? (January 2017). Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Vol. 56, Issue 1, pp. 73-121, 2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2881010 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/irel.12165

John T. Addison (Contact Author)

University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

The Francis M. Hipp Building
1705 College Street
Columbia, SC 29208
United States
803-777-7400 (Phone)
803-777-6876 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://mooreschool.sc.edu/moore/economics/profiles/addison.htm

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Paulino Teixeira

Universidade de Coimbra - Faculdade de Economia ( email )

Av. Dias da Silva, 165
Coimbra, 3004-512
Portugal

Center for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1 D-68161 Mannheim
Germany

Katalin Evers

Government of the Federal Republic of Germany - Institute for Employment Research (IAB) ( email )

Lutz Bellmann

Institute for Employment Research (IAB) ( email )

Regensburger Str. 104
Nuremberg, 90478
Germany
+49 911 179 3046 (Phone)
+49 911 179 3297 (Fax)

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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