The Labor‐Market Impact of San Francisco's Employer‐Benefit Mandate

39 Pages Posted: 7 Dec 2016

See all articles by Carrie Colla

Carrie Colla

The Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy and Clinical Practice

William Dow

University of California, Berkeley - School of Public Health

Arindrajit Dube

University of Massachusetts Amherst

Date Written: January 2017

Abstract

We evaluate a San Francisco policy requiring employers to provide health benefits or contribute to a public‐option health plan to better understand the incidence of employer mandates through their effects on wages, employment, and prices. We develop an individual case study approach combining border discontinuity in policies and permutation‐type inference using other metropolitan areas. Findings indicate that employment patterns did not change appreciably following the policy, and there is little evidence of significant negative earnings in highly impacted sectors. However, approximately half of the incidence of the mandate in the restaurant sector fell on consumers via surcharges.

Suggested Citation

Colla, Carrie and Dow, William and Dube, Arindrajit, The Labor‐Market Impact of San Francisco's Employer‐Benefit Mandate (January 2017). Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Vol. 56, Issue 1, pp. 122-160, 2017, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2881011 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/irel.12166

Carrie Colla (Contact Author)

The Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy and Clinical Practice ( email )

Hanover, NH 03755
United States

William Dow

University of California, Berkeley - School of Public Health ( email )

50 University Hall #7360
Berkeley, CA 94720-7360
United States

Arindrajit Dube

University of Massachusetts Amherst ( email )

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