Whither Antitrust Enforcement in the Trump Administration?

February 2017 Antitrust Source 1

21 Pages Posted: 9 Dec 2016 Last revised: 25 Feb 2017

See all articles by Steven C. Salop

Steven C. Salop

Georgetown University Law Center

Carl Shapiro

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business

Date Written: February 2017

Abstract

The Trump Administration might follow Donald Trump’s populist campaign rhetoric and adopt an approach to antitrust enforcement that emphasizes reining in corporate power. This approach would honor the preferences of the working-class voters who have put Trump into office by vigorously enforcing the antitrust laws controlling mergers and exclusionary conduct by dominant firms. Alternatively, the Trump Administration might adopt a highly permissive, laissez-faire approach to antitrust. That approach would allow further consolidation of corporate power and would disappoint the substantial majority of Americans who believe that the American economy is rigged to advantage the rich and powerful. We discuss these alternative approaches and offer a number of suggestions for how the Trump Administration can use antitrust enforcement and competition policy to rein in corporate power while respecting antitrust precedent and staying true to modern antitrust principles.

Keywords: Antitrust, Antitrust Law, Antitrust Policy, Antitrust Enforcement, Competition Policy

Suggested Citation

Salop, Steven C. and Shapiro, Carl, Whither Antitrust Enforcement in the Trump Administration? (February 2017). February 2017 Antitrust Source 1. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2881550

Steven C. Salop

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States
202-662-9095 (Phone)
202-662-9497 (Fax)

Carl Shapiro (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

545 Student Services Building, #1900
2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-5905 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu

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