The Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism

40 Pages Posted: 7 Dec 2016 Last revised: 5 Sep 2019

See all articles by Inácio Bó

Inácio Bó

University of York - Department of Economics and Related Studies

Rustamdjan Hakimov

WZB Berlin Social Science Center; University of Lausanne

Date Written: September 1, 2019

Abstract

The last few years have seen an increasing use of sequential online mechanisms, instead of the traditional direct counterparts, in college admissions in countries such as Germany, Brazil, and China. We describe those, and identify shortcomings they have in terms of incentives and outcome properties. We introduce a new family of mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, which improve upon these shortcomings. Unlike most mechanisms available in the literature, which ask students for a full preference ranking over all colleges, they are instead sequentially asked to make choices or submit partial rankings from sets of colleges. These are used to produce, in each step, a tentative allocation. If at some point it is determined that a student cannot be accepted into a college anymore, then she is asked to make another choice among those which would tentatively accept her. Participants following the simple strategy of choosing the most preferred college in each step is a robust equilibrium that yields the Student Optimal Stable Matching.

Keywords: Market Design, Matching, Iterative Mechanisms, College Admissions

JEL Classification: C78, C92, D63, D78, D82

Suggested Citation

Bó, Inácio and Hakimov, Rustamdjan, The Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (September 1, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2881880 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2881880

Inácio Bó (Contact Author)

University of York - Department of Economics and Related Studies ( email )

Heslington
York, YO1 5DD
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.inaciobo.com

Rustamdjan Hakimov

WZB Berlin Social Science Center ( email )

Reichpietschufer 50
D-10785 Berlin, 10785
Germany

University of Lausanne ( email )

Quartier Chambronne
Lausanne, 1016
Switzerland

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