The Burdens of Proof: Discriminatory Power, Weight of Evidence, and Tenacity of Belief
Posted: 10 Dec 2016
Date Written: December 8, 2016
Adjudicative tribunals in both criminal and noncriminal cases rely on the concept of the "burden of proof" to resolve uncertainty about facts. Perhaps surprisingly, this concept remains clouded and deeply controversial. Written by an internationally renowned scholar, this book explores contemporary thinking on the evidential requirements that are critical for all practical decision making, including adjudication. Although the idea that evidence must favor one side over the other to a specified degree, such as "beyond reasonable doubt;" is familiar, less well understood is an idea associated with the work of John Maynard Keynes, namely, that there are requirements on the total amount of evidence considered to decide a case. The author expertly explores this distinct Keynesian concept and its implications. Hypothetical examples and litigated cases are included to assist understanding of the ideas developed. Implications include an expanded conception of the burden of producing evidence and how it should be administered.
Keywords: Burden of Proof, Evidence, Facts, Decision Making, Weight of Evidence, Probability, Weight of Evidence, Probability
JEL Classification: K41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation