Time Preferences: Do They Matter in Bargaining?

U of London Queen Mary & Westfield College Econ. Working Paper No. 445

53 Pages Posted: 26 Nov 2001

See all articles by Paola Manzini

Paola Manzini

University of St. Andrews - School of Economics and Finance; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Date Written: October 2001

Abstract

Experimental studies of bargaining generally impose time preferences' on subjects, in the sense that in case of disagreement, the experimenter reduces the size of the surplus bargained over by imposing exogenously some monetary cost. Contrary to this practice, in this study time preferences are first elicited in a preliminary phase, and then bargaining begins. I show that although subjects are sensitive to the timing of a monetary reward, this plays no role in determining bargaining behaviour. Furthermore, when the bargaining game is played in conventional experimental setting with monetary costs of delay, these do have an impact on subjects' conduct in negotiations.

Keywords: Bargaining, Time preferences, Experiments

Suggested Citation

Manzini, Paola, Time Preferences: Do They Matter in Bargaining? (October 2001). U of London Queen Mary & Westfield College Econ. Working Paper No. 445. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=288343 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.288343

Paola Manzini (Contact Author)

University of St. Andrews - School of Economics and Finance ( email )

North St
Saint Andrews, Fife KY16 9AJ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~pm210/

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
49
Abstract Views
672
PlumX Metrics