Dividend Reductions, Reinstatements, and Substitution with Repurchases

57 Pages Posted: 12 Dec 2016 Last revised: 15 May 2017

See all articles by Kathleen M. Kahle

Kathleen M. Kahle

University of Arizona - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Ryan Williams

Imperial College London; Enoda

Date Written: May 7, 2017

Abstract

Using a sample of dividend cuts and omissions between 1994 and 2013, we explore the cycle of dividend reductions due to a financial shock and the subsequent increase in payouts during the recovery. We indeed find that firms are more likely to cut and/or omit dividends during the recent crisis. While financial constraints are a first order consideration in these decisions, many of these firms reinitiate dividends and/or initiate share repurchase programs soon after, indicating that the effects of the crisis are less permanent than the causes of cuts and omissions in other years. Firms with a dividend-preferring blockholder reinstate faster than other firms following the crisis. Additionally, firms without a recent repurchase history that cut dividends during the crisis are more likely to subsequently repurchase than firms who cut in non-crisis years. Firms with dividend-preferring blockholders do not exhibit this propensity to shift payouts, indicating that some firms used the crisis as an opportunity to modify their payout policies. Market reactions to dividend reductions during the crisis are significantly worse than in non-crisis years, indicating that investors did not anticipate the quicker recovery in corporate payout in post-crisis years.

Keywords: payout policy, dividends, repurchases, substitution

JEL Classification: G30, G35

Suggested Citation

Kahle, Kathleen M. and Williams, Ryan, Dividend Reductions, Reinstatements, and Substitution with Repurchases (May 7, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2883689 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2883689

Kathleen M. Kahle (Contact Author)

University of Arizona - Department of Finance ( email )

McClelland Hall
P.O. Box 210108
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States
520-621-7489 (Phone)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Ryan Williams

Imperial College London ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London, Greater London SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

Enoda ( email )

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
224
Abstract Views
1,899
Rank
284,535
PlumX Metrics