The Law and Economics of Shadow Banking

Forthcoming in Iris H. Chiu & Iain MacNeil (eds.), Research Handbook on Shadow Banking: Legal and Regulatory Aspects, Edward Elgar (2017)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 339/2017

52 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 2016 Last revised: 13 Apr 2017

See all articles by Alessio M. Pacces

Alessio M. Pacces

Amsterdam Law School / Amsterdam Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute

Hossein Nabilou

Universite du Luxembourg - Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance; University College London Center for Blockchain Technologies

Date Written: March 26, 2017

Abstract

This essay discusses the economic case for regulating shadow banking. Focusing on systemic risk, shadow banking is defined as leveraging on collateral to support liquidity promises. Regulating shadow banking is efficient because of the negative externality stemming from systemic risk. However, because uncertainty undermines the precise measurement of systemic risk, quantity regulation is preferable to a Pigovian tax to cope with this externality. This paper argues that regulation should limit the leverage of shadow banking mainly by imposing a minimum haircut regulation on the assets being used as collateral for funding.

Keywords: Shadow banking, maturity transformation, safe assets, leverage, liquidity, collateral, haircut, externalities, quantity regulation, Pigovian tax, Money Market Mutual Funds, repo, derivatives, central clearing, Qualified Financial Contracts

JEL Classification: G01, G23, G28, K22, K23

Suggested Citation

Pacces, Alessio Maria and Nabilou, Hossein, The Law and Economics of Shadow Banking (March 26, 2017). Forthcoming in Iris H. Chiu & Iain MacNeil (eds.), Research Handbook on Shadow Banking: Legal and Regulatory Aspects, Edward Elgar (2017), European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 339/2017, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2884374

Alessio Maria Pacces (Contact Author)

Amsterdam Law School / Amsterdam Business School ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.uva.nl/profiel/p/a/a.m.pacces/a.m.pacces.html

European Corporate Governance Institute ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://https://ecgi.global/users/alessio-pacces

Hossein Nabilou

Universite du Luxembourg - Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance ( email )

4 Rue Alphonse Weicker
Office: B203
Luxembourg, L-2721
Luxembourg
+352 46 66 44 5450 (Phone)
+352 46 66 44 35450 (Fax)

University College London Center for Blockchain Technologies ( email )

UCL CBT UCL Computer Science
Malet Place London WC
London, London
United Kingdom

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