The Role of Feedback in Dynamic Crowdsourcing Contests: A Structural Empirical Analysis

63 Pages Posted: 14 Dec 2016 Last revised: 10 Jan 2019

See all articles by Zhaohui (Zoey) Jiang

Zhaohui (Zoey) Jiang

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Yan Huang

Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business

Damian R. Beil

Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Date Written: December 6, 2018

Abstract

In this paper, we empirically examine the impact of performance feedback on the outcome of crowdsourcing contests. We develop a dynamic structural model to capture the economic processes that drive contest participants' behavior, and estimate the model using a rich data set about real online logo design contests. The model captures key features of the crowdsourcing context, including a large participant pool, entries by new participants throughout the contest, exploitation (revision of previous submissions) and exploration (radically novel submissions) behaviors by contest incumbents, and the participants' strategic choice among these entry, exploration, and exploitation decisions in a dynamic game. Using counter-factual simulations, we compare the outcome of crowdsourcing contests under alternative feedback disclosure policies and award levels. Our simulation results suggest that the full feedback policy (providing feedback throughout the contest) may not be optimal. The late feedback policy (providing feedback only in the second half of the contest) leads to a better overall contest outcome.

Keywords: Crowdsourcing Contests, Feedback, Econometric Analysis, Structural Modeling, Dynamic Game

Suggested Citation

Jiang, Zhaohui (Zoey) and Huang, Yan and Beil, Damian R., The Role of Feedback in Dynamic Crowdsourcing Contests: A Structural Empirical Analysis (December 6, 2018). Ross School of Business Paper No. 1334. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2884922 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2884922

Zhaohui (Zoey) Jiang (Contact Author)

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States

Yan Huang

Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business ( email )

5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

Damian R. Beil

Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/a/umich.edu/damianbeil/

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