Intermediation Markups and Monetary Policy Passthrough

61 Pages Posted: 14 Dec 2016 Last revised: 1 Oct 2017

See all articles by Semyon Malamud

Semyon Malamud

Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Swiss Finance Institute

Andreas Schrimpf

Bank for International Settlements (BIS) - Monetary and Economic Department; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Tübingen

Date Written: September 30, 2017

Abstract

We introduce intermediation frictions into the classical monetary model with fully flexible prices. Trade in financial assets occurs through intermediaries who bargain over a full set of state-contingent claims with their customers. Monetary policy is redistributive and affects intermediaries' ability to extract rents. This opens up a new transmission channel to rates in the wider economy. We find that the pass-through efficiency of quantitative easing (QE) and tightening (QT) policies depends crucially on the anticipated relationship between future monetary policy and future stock market returns (the 'Central Bank Put').

The strength of the Central Bank Put affects the room for maneuver in monetary policy: If it is too weak, balance sheet policies become inefficient. When the Central Bank Put is very strong, however, monetary policy may even be destabilizing and lead to greater frequency of market tantrums.

Keywords: Monetary Policy, Stock Returns, Intermediation, Market Frictions

JEL Classification: G12, E52, E40, E44

Suggested Citation

Malamud, Semyon and Schrimpf, Andreas, Intermediation Markups and Monetary Policy Passthrough (September 30, 2017). Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 16-75, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2885191 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2885191

Semyon Malamud (Contact Author)

Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne ( email )

Lausanne, 1015
Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Swiss Finance Institute

c/o University of Geneva
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
CH-1211 Geneva 4
Switzerland

Andreas Schrimpf

Bank for International Settlements (BIS) - Monetary and Economic Department ( email )

Centralbahnplatz 2
CH-4002 Basel
Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

University of Tübingen ( email )

Wilhelmstr. 19
72074 Tuebingen, Baden Wuerttemberg 72074
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
246
Abstract Views
2,353
Rank
256,522
PlumX Metrics