Lexicographic Choice Under Variable Capacity Constraints
31 Pages Posted: 16 Dec 2016 Last revised: 23 Sep 2018
Date Written: September 14, 2018
In several matching markets, in order to achieve diversity, agents’ priorities are allowed to vary across an institution’s available seats, and the institution is let to choose agents in a lexicographic fashion based on a predetermined ordering of the seats, called a lexicographic choice rule. Lexicographic choice rules have been particularly useful in achieving diversity at schools while allocating school seats. We provide a characterization of lexicographic choice rules, which reveals their distinguishing properties from other plausible choice rules. Moreover, we study the market design implications of using lexicographic choice rules and provide a characterization of deferred acceptance mechanisms that operate based on a lexicographic choice structure. We also discuss some implications for the Boston school choice system and show that our analysis can be helpful in applications to select among plausible choice rules.
Keywords: choice rules, lexicographic choice, deferred acceptance, diversity
JEL Classification: C78, D47, D78
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation