Lexicographic Choice Under Variable Capacity Constraints

31 Pages Posted: 16 Dec 2016 Last revised: 23 Sep 2018

See all articles by Battal Doğan

Battal Doğan

Department of Economics, University of Bristol

Serhat Dogan

Bilkent University - Department of Economics

Kemal Yildiz

Bilkent University - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 14, 2018

Abstract

In several matching markets, in order to achieve diversity, agents’ priorities are allowed to vary across an institution’s available seats, and the institution is let to choose agents in a lexicographic fashion based on a predetermined ordering of the seats, called a lexicographic choice rule. Lexicographic choice rules have been particularly useful in achieving diversity at schools while allocating school seats. We provide a characterization of lexicographic choice rules, which reveals their distinguishing properties from other plausible choice rules. Moreover, we study the market design implications of using lexicographic choice rules and provide a characterization of deferred acceptance mechanisms that operate based on a lexicographic choice structure. We also discuss some implications for the Boston school choice system and show that our analysis can be helpful in applications to select among plausible choice rules.

Keywords: choice rules, lexicographic choice, deferred acceptance, diversity

JEL Classification: C78, D47, D78

Suggested Citation

Doğan, Battal and Dogan, Serhat and Yildiz, Kemal, Lexicographic Choice Under Variable Capacity Constraints (September 14, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2886494 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2886494

Battal Doğan (Contact Author)

Department of Economics, University of Bristol ( email )

United Kingdom

Serhat Dogan

Bilkent University - Department of Economics ( email )

06533 Ankara
Turkey

Kemal Yildiz

Bilkent University - Department of Economics ( email )

Bilkent University, Dept. of Economics
BILKENT
Ankara, 06800
Turkey

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