Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2886516
 


 



Promotion Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from Chinese Schools


Naureen Karachiwalla


International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)

Albert Park


Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST); Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - HKUST Institute for Emerging Market Studies (IEMS)

December 2016

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11704

Abstract:     
We provide evidence that promotion incentives influence the effort of public employees by studying China's system of promotions for teachers. Predictions from a tournament model of promotion are tested using retrospective panel data on primary and middle school teachers. Consistent with theory, promotions are associated with wage increases, higher wage increases are associated with better performance, and teachers increase effort in years leading up to promotion eligibility but reduce effort if they are repeatedly passed over for promotion. Evaluation scores are positively associated with teacher time use and with student test scores, diminishing concerns that evaluations are manipulated.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 59

Keywords: China, incentives, promotions, teachers

JEL Classification: J31, J33, J45, M51


Date posted: December 16, 2016  

Suggested Citation

Karachiwalla, Naureen and Park, Albert, Promotion Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from Chinese Schools (December 2016). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11704. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2886516

Contact Information

Naureen Karachiwalla (Contact Author)
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) ( email )
2033 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
United States

Albert Park
Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) ( email )
Clearwater Bay
Kowloon
Hong Kong
Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - HKUST Institute for Emerging Market Studies (IEMS) ( email )
IAS 2019, Lo Ka Chung Building,
Lee Shau Kee Campus, HKUST
Clear Water Bay, Kowloon
Hong Kong
HOME PAGE: http://iems.ust.hk
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