An 'Unpresidented' [Sic] Era of Budgeting: The Relationship between the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Post-2016

9 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2016

See all articles by Usman W. Chohan

Usman W. Chohan

UNSW Business School; Critical Blockchain Research Initiative (CBRI); Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS)

Date Written: December 19, 2016

Abstract

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) have had a long-standing relationship of nonpartisan mutual reinforcement premised on analytical rigour. The CBO has also played a role in “keeping them [the OMB] honest” in terms of exerting a non-political budgeting standard that allows the OMB to produce more nonpartisan budget analysis without executive recrimination. This notion of “keeping them honest” is revisited in this discussion paper, in light of the Trump-administration and specifically with respect to its appointment of OMB director Mick Mulvaney. The paper suggests that the CBO’s nonpartisan exertion of analytical rigour will assume an even greater importance but is likely to face “unpresidented” [Sic, unprecedented] resistance from the executive.

Keywords: legislative oversight, congressional budget office, office of management and budget, budget, deficit, accountability, Donald Trump, 2016 election, fiscal policy

Suggested Citation

Chohan, Usman W., An 'Unpresidented' [Sic] Era of Budgeting: The Relationship between the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Post-2016 (December 19, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2887481 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2887481

Usman W. Chohan (Contact Author)

UNSW Business School ( email )

UNSW Business School
High St
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia

Critical Blockchain Research Initiative (CBRI) ( email )

Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS) ( email )

Rawalpindi
Pakistan

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