The Dollar Profits to Insider Trading

77 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2016 Last revised: 2 May 2019

See all articles by Peter Cziraki

Peter Cziraki

University of Toronto - Department of Economics; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Jasmin Gider

Tilburg University - School of Economics and Management

Date Written: April 30, 2019

Abstract

This paper studies trade quantities and dollar profits to insider trading, to investigate whether corporate insiders can exploit their superior information about the firm. We find that dollar profits are economically small for a typical insider, the median insider earning abnormal profits of $464 per year. Variables that predict percentage returns fail to predict dollar profits, because they are inversely related to quantities, suggesting that insiders with the largest superior information do not turn this advantage into large economic rents. We exploit bunching around a legally-imposed threshold to construct a new measure of insiders’ intentions, which predicts both dollar profits and returns. This measure successfully identifies a small subset (0.5%) of insiders whose profits are significantly higher, with a median of $2,500 per year. Finally, we find that dollar profits do not unambiguously decrease with SEC monitoring because of changes in the composition of insiders: returns decrease for some insiders but trade frequency increases for others. Our work highlights that several empirical results depend critically on using dollar profits instead of percentage returns. The profits to legal insider trading are not a meaningful source of private benefits for the vast majority of insiders.

Keywords: insider trading, trading profits, corporate governance, executive compensation

JEL Classification: G14, G34, M52

Suggested Citation

Cziraki, Peter and Gider, Jasmin, The Dollar Profits to Insider Trading (April 30, 2019). TILEC Discussion Paper No. DP 2017-005; 14th Annual Mid-Atlantic Research Conference in Finance (MARC). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2887628 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2887628

Peter Cziraki (Contact Author)

University of Toronto - Department of Economics ( email )

150 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S3G7
Canada
+1 416 946 3298 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/petercziraki

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Jasmin Gider

Tilburg University - School of Economics and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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