How Does Policy Affect Trading Relationships? Evidence from the U.S. Repo Market

46 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2016 Last revised: 21 Aug 2020

See all articles by Sriya Anbil

Sriya Anbil

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Zeynep Senyuz

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 31, 2020

Abstract

We analyze changes in monetary and regulatory policy on trading relationships in the U.S. repo market. We estimate that when the Federal Reserve (Fed) introduced its reverse repo (RRP) facility, money market mutual funds (MMFs) eligible to lend to the Fed cut their lending in the triparty repo market to broker-dealers (dealers) by 16%, on average. By providing a backstop, the RRP facility shifted bargaining power towards MMFs eligible to lend to the Fed, and away from dealers. Although the RRP facility strengthened trading relationships between MMFs and dealers, it also prevented some foreign dealers, who were subject to less stringent implementation of the Basel III leverage ratio, from engaging in regulatory arbitrage as effectively. We find that these policy changes influenced the way MMFs managed their balance sheets and made MMFs that were eligible to lend to the Fed safer.

Keywords: repo, RRP facility, monetary policy, Federal Reserve, Basel III

JEL Classification: C32, E43, E52

Suggested Citation

Anbil, Sriya and Senyuz, Zeynep, How Does Policy Affect Trading Relationships? Evidence from the U.S. Repo Market (July 31, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2888163 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2888163

Sriya Anbil (Contact Author)

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

Zeynep Senyuz

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

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