Responsible for Truth? Peirce on Judgment and Assertion

Cognitio, vol. 7, 2006, pp. 317-336

Bocconi Legal Studies Research PaperNo. 2888435

14 Pages Posted: 21 Dec 2016  

Giovanni Tuzet

Bocconi University - Department of Law

Date Written: 2006

Abstract

I consider Peirce’s remarks on judgment and assertion, in particular his idea that a judgment, being an act of mental assent, is an internal act while an assertion is an external act. Related to that, I consider the question whether in asserting something we are responsible for the truth of what is asserted. I rather claim that we are responsible for conformity to actual belief (sincerity) and the way we fixed our belief.

Then I focus on the difficulties in assessing our responsibility in judging and asserting if judgment and assertion are considered in a narrow and separate sense. Furthermore, we should take into account the social and normative aspects of judging and asserting. So I argue for a broad conception of judgment, with assertion as one of its parts and modeled on the process of legal judgment. In this light, the idea of someone being responsible for the truth of his assertions will be reconsidered.

Keywords: Assertion, Judgment, Peirce, Truth

Suggested Citation

Tuzet, Giovanni, Responsible for Truth? Peirce on Judgment and Assertion (2006). Cognitio, vol. 7, 2006, pp. 317-336; Bocconi Legal Studies Research PaperNo. 2888435. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2888435

Giovanni Tuzet (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Law ( email )

Via Roentgen, 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

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