Cheating on Your Spouse: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

RIT Economics Department Working Paper No. 16-15

11 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2016

See all articles by Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - Department of Economics

Hamid Beladi

University of Texas at San Antonio - College of Business - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 22, 2016

Abstract

In this note we analyze a game model of marital infidelity. The husband can either be faithful to or cheat on his wife. The wife can either monitor or not monitor her husband. We first determine the best response correspondences of the two players. Second, we explain why there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the game under study. Third, we show that there exists a unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the game. Finally, we demonstrate the nexus between our marital infidelity game and the prominent Matching Pennies game.

Keywords: Cheating, Faithfulness, Monitoring, Mixed-Strategy, Static Game

JEL Classification: J12, D81, C72

Suggested Citation

Batabyal, Amitrajeet A. and Beladi, Hamid, Cheating on Your Spouse: A Game-Theoretic Analysis (December 22, 2016). RIT Economics Department Working Paper No. 16-15, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2889055 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2889055

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal (Contact Author)

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

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Hamid Beladi

University of Texas at San Antonio - College of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

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San Antonio, TX 78249
United States
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