Cheating on Your Spouse: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
RIT Economics Department Working Paper No. 16-15
11 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2016
Date Written: December 22, 2016
In this note we analyze a game model of marital infidelity. The husband can either be faithful to or cheat on his wife. The wife can either monitor or not monitor her husband. We first determine the best response correspondences of the two players. Second, we explain why there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the game under study. Third, we show that there exists a unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the game. Finally, we demonstrate the nexus between our marital infidelity game and the prominent Matching Pennies game.
Keywords: Cheating, Faithfulness, Monitoring, Mixed-Strategy, Static Game
JEL Classification: J12, D81, C72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation