The Freedom of Association Protocol: A Localised Non-Judicial Grievance Mechanism for Workers' Rights in Global Supply Chains

Non-Judicial Redress Mechanisms Report Series No. 19

53 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2016 Last revised: 15 Jul 2019

See all articles by Tim Connor

Tim Connor

University of Newcastle (Australia) - Newcastle Law School

Annie Delaney

RMIT University

Sarah Rennie

Asian Law Centre, University of Melbourne

Date Written: October 24, 2016

Abstract

This report examines the contribution of a non-judicial mechanism designed to encourage respect for freedom of association within Indonesia’s export-oriented apparel and footwear sector. The Freedom of Association Protocol (the ‘Protocol’) is a multi-party agreement created by Indonesian unions, factory owners (‘suppliers’) and global brand-owning companies (‘brands’), including Nike, Adidas, Puma and New Balance. In Indonesia freedom of association is protected by legislation and union busting constitutes a criminal offence; however, implementation of these laws is weak and routine violations continue to occur. The Protocol establishes specific standards for freedom of association in participating factories, as well as grievance resolution procedures for violations of those standards. It currently applies to approximately 300,000 factory workers employed in industrial districts throughout Java, most of whom are young women. It was developed in the context of a long-running global campaign by trade unions and labour rights organisations to persuade sportswear brands to uphold workers’ rights in their supply chains.

Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility, Trade Unions, Indonesia, Labour Rights, Labor Rights, Sweatshops, Workers, Nike, Reebok, Adidas, New Balance, Puma, Pentland

Suggested Citation

Connor, Tim and Delaney, Annie and Rennie, Sarah, The Freedom of Association Protocol: A Localised Non-Judicial Grievance Mechanism for Workers' Rights in Global Supply Chains (October 24, 2016). Non-Judicial Redress Mechanisms Report Series No. 19, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2889112

Tim Connor (Contact Author)

University of Newcastle (Australia) - Newcastle Law School ( email )

1 University Drive
Callaghan, 2308
Australia

Annie Delaney

RMIT University ( email )

PO Box 2476
Melbourne, 3001
Australia
61 3 99255741 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.rmit.edu.au/contact/staff-contacts/academic-staff/d/delaney-dr-annie

Sarah Rennie

Asian Law Centre, University of Melbourne ( email )

185 Pelham Street
Carlton, Victoria 3053
Australia

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
120
Abstract Views
756
rank
320,026
PlumX Metrics