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The Value Implications of Mandatory Clawback Provisions

56 Pages Posted: 28 Dec 2016 Last revised: 17 Nov 2017

Tor-Erik Bakke

University of Oklahoma - Division of Finance

Hamed Mahmudi

University of Oklahoma - Division of Finance

Aazam Virani

University of Arizona - Department of Finance

Date Written: November 2017

Abstract

Performance-based compensation can give managers an incentive to misreport financial information. This incentive can be mitigated by requiring the recoupment of erroneously awarded performance-based compensation from executives, which is known as a clawback provision. We study the value implications of clawback provisions by examining the stock market’s reaction to the SEC’s announcement of proposed Rule 10D-1 that mandates clawback provisions. We find that relative to firms that had voluntarily adopted a clawback provision, firms without a clawback provision experienced positive abnormal returns. Furthermore, the announcement had the greatest positive impact on firms without a clawback with more powerful managers. Our findings suggest that clawbacks are value-enhancing, but powerful managers may resist their adoption, which is why regulation mandating clawbacks may be necessary.

Suggested Citation

Bakke, Tor-Erik and Mahmudi, Hamed and Virani, Aazam, The Value Implications of Mandatory Clawback Provisions (November 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2890578

Tor-Erik Bakke

University of Oklahoma - Division of Finance ( email )

Norman, OK 73019
United States

Hamed Mahmudi

University of Oklahoma - Division of Finance ( email )

Norman, OK 73019
United States

Aazam Virani (Contact Author)

University of Arizona - Department of Finance ( email )

McClelland Hall
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States

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