Multidimensional Platform Design

5 Pages Posted: 4 Jan 2017 Last revised: 2 Dec 2020

See all articles by Andre Veiga

Andre Veiga

Imperial College London

E. Glen Weyl

Plural Technology Collaboratory, Microsoft Research Special Projects; Plurality Institute; GETTING-Plurality Research Network

Alexander White

Tsinghua University - School of Economics & Management

Date Written: January 4, 2017

Abstract

Successful platforms attract not just many users, but also those of the right kind. "The right kind of user" is one who can either be directly monetized or who differentially attracts other valuable users. Bonacich centrality on the network of user sorting with direct value of monetization captures this feedback loop and thus characterizes the value of user characteristics. We use this value to determine optimal steady-state platform design and reliable means for platforms to reach such a steady state. We apply these results respectively to explain the dynamic growth strategy of social networks and urban development policies of cities.

Appendix available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2891805.

Keywords: Platforms, Multidimensional Heterogeneity, Quality, Design, Sorting, Centrality

JEL Classification: D42, D85, L86, R58

Suggested Citation

Veiga, Andre and Weyl, Eric Glen and White, Alexander, Multidimensional Platform Design (January 4, 2017). American Economic Review, Vol. 107, No. 5, pp. 191-195, 2017., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2891806

Andre Veiga

Imperial College London ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London, Greater London SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

Eric Glen Weyl (Contact Author)

Plural Technology Collaboratory, Microsoft Research Special Projects ( email )

11 Ellsworth Ave, #2
Cambridge, MA 02139
United States
8579984513 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.glenweyl.com

Plurality Institute ( email )

GETTING-Plurality Research Network ( email )

124 Mount Auburn Street
Suite 520N
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Alexander White

Tsinghua University - School of Economics & Management ( email )

Mailbox A-44
Weilun Building
Beijing, 100084
China

HOME PAGE: http://alex-white.net

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