Contracts and Competition in the Pay-Tv Market

LBS, Department of Economics, Working Paper No. DP 2001/5

31 Pages Posted: 7 Nov 2001

See all articles by David Harbord

David Harbord

Market Analysis Ltd; Ferdescol.org

Marco Ottaviani

Bocconi University - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 2001

Abstract

This paper analyses how contractual arrangement for the sale and resale of premium programming effect competition in the pay-TV market. Competition is less effective when resale contracts specify per-subscriber fees rather than lump-sum payments. When premium programming is sold at terms similar to those observed in the UK, consumers can be made worse off than in the absence of premium programming. A number of potential remedies are considered. A ban on exclusive vertical contracts would intensify downstream competition and transfer the benefits of premium programming to consumers.

Keywords: Pay TV, contracts

JEL Classification: L13, L41, L96

Suggested Citation

Harbord, David and Ottaviani, Marco, Contracts and Competition in the Pay-Tv Market (July 2001). LBS, Department of Economics, Working Paper No. DP 2001/5. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=289334 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.289334

David Harbord

Market Analysis Ltd ( email )

34 Great Clarendon St
Oxford, OX26AT
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://market-analysis.co.uk/

Ferdescol.org ( email )

Avenida 82 No. 10 – 62, Piso 6
Bogotá
Colombia

HOME PAGE: http://www.ferdescol.org/

Marco Ottaviani (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
524
Abstract Views
3,103
rank
51,515
PlumX Metrics