Report on Information on Groups

18 Pages Posted: 16 Jan 2017

See all articles by John Armour

John Armour

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law; University of Oxford - Said Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Gintautas Bartkus

Vilnius University - Law Faculty; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Blanaid J. Clarke

Trinity College Dublin - School of Law

Pierre-Henri Conac

University of Luxembourg; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

H. J. de Kluiver

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Law

Holger Fleischer

Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law

Mónica Fuentes

Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM)

Jesper Lau Hansen

University of Copenhagen - Faculty of Law (FOCOFIMA)

Vanessa Knapp

Queen Mary University of London

Marco Lamandini

University of Bologna - Department of Business Law

Arkadiusz Radwan

Polish Academy of Sciences - Scientific Center in Vienna; Vytautas Magnus University - Faculty of Law; University of Warsaw - Faculty of Law and Administration

Christoph Teichmann

University of Würzburg

R.H. van het Kaar

Independent

Martin Winner

Vienna University of Economics and Business - Department of Business Law

Date Written: March 31, 2016

Abstract

On 26 January 2015, the European Commission requested the Informal Company Law Expert Group (ICLEG) to consider the issue of information on groups. In response to this call one member, Martin Winner, was charged with producing a report on behalf of the Group.

The Commission’s action plan of 2012 announced an initiative on simplified communication of a group’s structure to investors. This announcement was based inter alia on the Report of the Reflection Group from 2011, which recommended making basic information on the group structure readily available to investors and presenting that information in an investor-friendly manner.

The report presents the state of the play regarding transparency of groups of companies in the Member States and at the EU level. It includes several recommendations. Among others, it recommends that listed companies should make public basic information on the group functioning and management in standardised visual form and inform investors in a simplified manner of the central group structure, especially by visualisation. The Commission should consult on whether such information should be mandatory, given on a comply-or-explain basis in the Corporate Governance Statement or encouraged in a non-legislative manner. The Commission should also consult on whether disclosure should be limited to the identity of the ultimate parent or also include verbal information on group decision-making mechanisms. The Commission should consult on the method of disclosure, especially whether disclosure should be made via the company website, the national company register, the company’s correspondence or any combination of the above.

Keywords: European Company Law, Company Law, Groups of Companies, Transparency of Groups

JEL Classification: K22

Suggested Citation

Armour, John and Bartkus, Gintautas and Clarke, Blanaid J. and Conac, Pierre-Henri and de Kluiver, H. J. and Fleischer, Holger and Fuentes, Mónica and Hansen, Jesper Lau and Knapp, Vanessa and Lamandini, Marco and Radwan, Arkadiusz and Teichmann, Christoph and van het Kaar, R.H. and Winner, Martin, Report on Information on Groups (March 31, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2893694 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2893694

John Armour

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )

St Cross Building
St Cross Road
Oxford, OX1 3UL
United Kingdom
+44 1865 281616 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ox.ac.uk/people/john-armour

University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )

Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain

HOME PAGE: http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/about-us/people/john-armour

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Gintautas Bartkus

Vilnius University - Law Faculty ( email )

Saulėtekio ave. 9, building I
Vilnius, LT-10222
Lithuania

HOME PAGE: http://www.tf.vu.lt

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Blanaid J. Clarke

Trinity College Dublin - School of Law ( email )

House 39, New Square
Dublin 2
Ireland
Ph 00353 (0)18961632 (Phone)

Pierre-Henri Conac (Contact Author)

University of Luxembourg ( email )

4, rue Alphonse Weicker
Luxembourg-Limpertsberg, L-2721
Luxembourg
00352 46 66 44 68 20 (Phone)
00352 46 66 44 68 11 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://wwwen.uni.lu/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://http:/www.ecgi.org

H. J. De Kluiver

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Law ( email )

Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

Holger Fleischer

Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law ( email )

Mittelweg 187
Hamburg, 20148
Germany

Mónica Fuentes

Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) ( email )

Facultad de Derecho. Avda. Complutense s/n
Madrid, Madrid 28040
Spain

Jesper Lau Hansen

University of Copenhagen - Faculty of Law (FOCOFIMA) ( email )

Studiestraede 6
Studiestrade 6
Copenhagen, DK-1455
Denmark

HOME PAGE: http://www.jur.ku.dk

Vanessa Knapp

Queen Mary University of London ( email )

Mile End Rd
Mile End Road
London, London E1 4NS
United Kingdom

Marco Lamandini

University of Bologna - Department of Business Law ( email )

via San Giacomo, 3
Bologna, Bologna
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.diritto.unibo.it

Arkadiusz Radwan

Polish Academy of Sciences - Scientific Center in Vienna ( email )

Boerhaavegasse 25
Vienna, 1030
Austria

HOME PAGE: http://www.viennapan.org

Vytautas Magnus University - Faculty of Law ( email )

Jonavos g. 66
Kaunas, LT-44191
Lithuania

University of Warsaw - Faculty of Law and Administration ( email )

Warszawa
Poland

Christoph Teichmann

University of Würzburg ( email )

Sanderring 2
Würzburg, DE 97070
Germany

R.H. Van het Kaar

Independent ( email )

Martin Winner

Vienna University of Economics and Business - Department of Business Law ( email )

Welthandelsplatz 1
Vienna, A-1020
Austria

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