The Bounds of Executive Discretion in the Regulatory State

21 Pages Posted: 7 Jan 2017

See all articles by Cary Coglianese

Cary Coglianese

University of Pennsylvania Law School

Christopher S. Yoo

University of Pennsylvania Law School; University of Pennsylvania - Annenberg School for Communication; University of Pennsylvania - School of Engineering and Applied Science

Date Written: 2016

Abstract

What are the proper bounds of executive discretion in the regulatory state, especially over administrative decisions not to take enforcement actions? This question, which, just by asking it, would seem to cast into some doubt the seemingly absolute discretion the executive branch has until now been thought to possess, has become the focal point of the latest debate to emerge over the U.S. Constitution’s separation of powers. That ever‐growing, heated debate is what motivated more than two dozen distinguished scholars to gather for a two‐day conference held late last year at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, a conference organized around the papers appearing in this special Issue of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. We are pleased to introduce this insightful collection of scholarship by explicating the conceptual contours underlying the contemporary debate over executive discretion, and its bounds, in the regulatory state.

Note: This abstract was prepared by the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.

Keywords: Administrative law, constitutional law, separation of powers, executive power, federal courts, Heckler v. Chaney, Presidency, executive branch, POTUS, President of the United States, executive discretion, agency enforcement discretion

Suggested Citation

Coglianese, Cary and Yoo, Christopher S., The Bounds of Executive Discretion in the Regulatory State (2016). University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 164, Pg. 1587, 2016; U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 16-47. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2894522

Cary Coglianese (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-6867 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.upenn.edu/coglianese

Christopher S. Yoo

University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom St.
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6204
United States
(215) 746-8772 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.upenn.edu/faculty/csyoo/

University of Pennsylvania - Annenberg School for Communication ( email )

3620 Walnut St.
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6220
United States
(215) 746-8772 (Phone)

University of Pennsylvania - School of Engineering and Applied Science ( email )

3330 Walnut St.
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6309
United States
(215) 746-8772 (Phone)

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