Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2894829
 


 



Incumbency Disadvantage in U.S. National Politics


Satyajit Chatterjee


Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

Burcu Eyigungor


Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

2017-01-05

FRB of Philadelphia Working Paper No. 16-36

Abstract:     
We document that postwar U.S. national elections show a strong pattern of “incumbency disadvantage”: If the presidency has been held by a party for some time, that party tends to lose seats in Congress. A model of partisan politics with policy inertia and elections is presented to explain this finding. We also find that the incumbency disadvantage comes sooner for Democrats than Republicans. Based on the observed Democratic bias in Congress (Democrats, on average, hold more seats in the House and Senate than Republicans), the model also offers an explanation for the second finding.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: rational partisan model, incumbency disadvantage, policy inertia, political disagreement model, partisan politics


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Date posted: January 8, 2017  

Suggested Citation

Chatterjee, Satyajit and Eyigungor, Burcu, Incumbency Disadvantage in U.S. National Politics (2017-01-05). FRB of Philadelphia Working Paper No. 16-36. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2894829

Contact Information

Satyajit Chatterjee (Contact Author)
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia ( email )
Ten Independence Mall
Philadelphia, PA 19106-1574
United States
215-574-3861 (Phone)
215-574-4364 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/chatterjeesatyajit/home
Burcu Eyigungor
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia ( email )
Ten Independence Mall
Philadelphia, PA 19106-1574
United States
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