High Prices in the U.S. For Life-Saving Drugs: Collective Bargaining Through Tort Law?

Marquette Benefits & Social Welfare Law Review, 17:2 (Spring 2016)

Emory Legal Studies Research Paper

55 Pages Posted: 10 Jan 2017

See all articles by Paul J. Zwier

Paul J. Zwier

Emory University School of Law

Date Written: 2016

Abstract

Sudden exorbitant price hikes to patients who have long taken life-saving drugs are more and more common in today's pharmaceutical market. The anxiety caused to patients who have been prescribed these drugs by their doctors is predictable and severe. Even when initially covered by insurance or through government programs, patients and their families can soon be made destitute by the high copays or caps on payments. This Essay argues that those who buy up life-saving drugs and decide to raise their prices, despite their knowledge of the consequences to patients, are committing the torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Despite challenges presented by class certification law, these patients should be allowed to qualify as a class for purposes of pursuing a price reduction in these drugs. Through class action collective bargaining, courts can avoid the pitfalls of waiting for piecemeal legislation for consumers of individual drugs and still receive the advantages of free market principled pricing through collective bargaining. And, in combination with legislation, patterned on statutes designed to address bad faith insurance practices, the courts can most effectively moderate high pricing and curtail pricing practices that may otherwise soon bankrupt our-healthcare system.

Suggested Citation

Zwier, Paul J., High Prices in the U.S. For Life-Saving Drugs: Collective Bargaining Through Tort Law? (2016). Marquette Benefits & Social Welfare Law Review, 17:2 (Spring 2016), Emory Legal Studies Research Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2895481

Paul J. Zwier (Contact Author)

Emory University School of Law ( email )

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