Purchase - $8 CEPR Subscribers Download

Add Paper to My Library

Killer Incentives: Status Competition and Pilot Performance During World War Ii

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11751

63 Pages Posted: 9 Jan 2017 Last revised: 14 Jul 2021

See all articles by Philipp Ager

Philipp Ager

University of Southern Denmark - Department of Business and Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Leonardo Bursztyn

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management

Hans-Joachim Voth

University of Zurich - UBS International Center of Economics in Society; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

There are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2017

Abstract

Using newly-collected data on death rates and aerial victories of more than 5,000 German fighter pilots during World War II, we examine the effects of public recognition on performance and risk-taking. When a particular pilot is honored publicly, both the victory rate and the death rate of his former peers increase. Fellow pilots react more if they come from the same region of Germany, or if they worked closely with him. Our results suggest that personal rivalry can be a prime motivating force, and that non-financial rewards can lead to a crowd-in of both effort and risk-taking via social connections.

JEL Classification: J24, J32, M52, N44

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Ager, Philipp and Bursztyn, Leonardo and Voth, Hans-Joachim, Killer Incentives: Status Competition and Pilot Performance During World War Ii (January 2017). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11751, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2896041

Philipp Ager (Contact Author)

University of Southern Denmark - Department of Business and Economics ( email )

DK-5230 Odense
Denmark

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Leonardo Bursztyn

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management ( email )

110 Westwood Plaza
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States

Hans-Joachim Voth

University of Zurich - UBS International Center of Economics in Society ( email )

Raemistrasse 71
Zuerich, 8006
Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Purchase - $8 CEPR Subscribers Download

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Place Job Opening

Paper statistics

Downloads

1

Abstract Views

585

PlumX Metrics

Feedback