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Networks to State Capture: Business Elite Networks and Mechanisms of Corporate State Capture in Central American Countries

40 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2017 Last revised: 16 Jul 2017

Julián Cárdenas

Freie Universität Berlin

Francisco Robles-Rivera

Forschungszentrum Brasilien am Lateinamerika Institut

Date Written: June 11, 2017

Abstract

The present research explores the relationships between business elite networks and the mechanisms of state capture. Specifically, it aims to find out what configuration of business elite networks enables corporate state capture. To achieve this goal, it first uncovers and analyses business elite networks through interlocking directorates in three Central American countries using network analysis, and second, analyses the relationship between business elite networks and the mechanisms that enable corporations to capture states namely: revolving doors and contributions to presidential campaigns in the 2014 elections. Findings indicate that when some of the business elites configure a large and cohesive business community, while the rest is fragmented, corporate state capture is more likely to occur since members of the business community occupy ministerial posts and contribute to the same political party, as in the case of Panama.

Keywords: Corporate State Capture, Business Elite Networks, Interlocking Directorates, Network Analysis, Central America, Revolving Doors, elites, corporate elites, corporate networks, Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, elite networks, networking, state capture

JEL Classification: A14, D85, Z13, O54

Suggested Citation

Cárdenas, Julián and Robles-Rivera, Francisco, Networks to State Capture: Business Elite Networks and Mechanisms of Corporate State Capture in Central American Countries (June 11, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2896153

Julián Cárdenas (Contact Author)

Freie Universität Berlin ( email )

Lateinamerika Institut
Boltzmannstr. 1
Berlin, 14195
Germany

Francisco Robles-Rivera

Forschungszentrum Brasilien am Lateinamerika Institut ( email )

Rüdesheimer Str. 54-56
D-14197
Berlin
Germany

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