A Survey on Labor Market Institutions, Collective Bargaining and Macroeconomic Performance

Catholic Univ. of Brasilia Econ. Working Paper No. 31

20 Pages Posted: 20 Nov 2001

See all articles by Francisco Carneiro

Francisco Carneiro

The World Bank

Amit Dar

World Bank - Latin America and Caribbean Region

Indermit S. Gill

Duke University

Date Written: November 2001

Abstract

The paper argues that the form in which collective bargaining is organized might be a decisive factor in determining the performance of modern industrialized economies. The whole literature on corporatism is concerned with showing that the degree of centralization and coordination in wage determination is a key factor in ensuring either a more or less painful adjustment to adverse economic conditions. In this sense, labor market institutions might assume one of two roles: (i) uncertainty reducers and catalysts of more flexible markets; or (ii) free-rider agents which would only be worried about appropriating product market quasi-rents. The first case seems to be more recurrent in corporatist countries where bargaining is centralized and coordinated. The second, more apparent where bargaining is decentralized and/or intermediate-centralized, is where rent-sharing seems pervasive and wage rigidity a strong possibility.

Keywords: Corporatism, unionism, bargaining models

JEL Classification: J5, J50, J64

Suggested Citation

Carneiro, Francisco Galrao and Dar, Amit and Gill, Indermit S., A Survey on Labor Market Institutions, Collective Bargaining and Macroeconomic Performance (November 2001). Catholic Univ. of Brasilia Econ. Working Paper No. 31. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=289664 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.289664

Francisco Galrao Carneiro (Contact Author)

The World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Amit Dar

World Bank - Latin America and Caribbean Region

1818 H Street NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Indermit S. Gill

Duke University ( email )

100 Fuqua Drive
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

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