Democracy Aid Eectiveness: Variation Across Regime Types

50 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2017 Last revised: 23 Oct 2018

See all articles by Anna Lührmann

Anna Lührmann

Göteborg University - Department of Political Science

Kelly M. McMann

Case Western Reserve University - Department of Political Science; Göteborg University - V-Dem Institute

Carolien Van Ham

University of New South Wales (UNSW)

Date Written: October 2018

Abstract

Large-N studies suggest that democracy aid is effective, while multiple small-N investigations call such findings into question. This paper accounts for this contradiction and significantly improves our understanding of democracy aid effectiveness by disaggregating democracy aid into specific types and examining effectiveness in different regime types. We argue that a specific type of aid is more likely to be effective when the aid does not pose a threat to regime survival and when the aid matches the particular democratic deficits in a country. Analysis of OECD aid and Varieties of Democracy data for 119 countries from 2002-2012 supports our argument.

Keywords: Democracy aid, democracy assistance, democracy promotion, democratization, electoral authoritarianism, aid effectiveness

Suggested Citation

Lührmann, Anna and McMann, Kelly M. and Van Ham, Carolien, Democracy Aid Eectiveness: Variation Across Regime Types (October 2018). V-Dem Working Paper 2018:40 revised. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2896872 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2896872

Anna Lührmann (Contact Author)

Göteborg University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Box 711
Göteborg, S-405 30
Sweden

Kelly M. McMann

Case Western Reserve University - Department of Political Science ( email )

11201 Euclid Avenue
Cleveland, OH 44106
United States

Göteborg University - V-Dem Institute ( email )

United States

Carolien Van Ham

University of New South Wales (UNSW) ( email )

Kensington
High St
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia

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